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Abstract. Rob Lovering has recently argued that since theists have been 
unable, by means of philosophical arguments, to convince 85 percent of 
professional philosophers that God exists, at least one of their defining beliefs 
must be either false or meaningless. This paper is a critical examination 
of his argument. First we present Lovering’s argument and point out its 
salient features. Next we explain why the argument’s conclusion is entirely 
acceptable for theists, even if, as we show, there are multiple problems with 
the premises.
1. THE ‘NUMBERS COUNT’ ARGUMENT STATED
In the recent discussion over peer disagreement, i.e. disagreement between 
parties that are equally apprised of the relevant evidence, equally capable 
of evaluating it, and equally aware of the disagreeing other, two positions 
stand out. First there is the ‘conciliatory’ view according to which, rough-
ly speaking,1 awareness of a disagreeing peer is evidence against one’s own 
view — and a reason to change it in some way.2 Second there is the ‘steadfast’ 
view according to which, roughly speaking, awareness of a disagreeing peer is 
not evidence against one’s own view — and no reason to change it. Rob Lover-
ing has recently argued for something like a third position in the disagree-
1 A much more precise presentation and discussion of the two views is Bryan Frances, 
Disagreement (Polity, 2014).
2 Various suggestions have been made as to what sort of change is called for. See, for in-
stance, David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News”, The Philosophi-
cal Review 116, no. 2 (2007) (disagreeing peers should ‘move to one another’), Hilary Korn-
blith, “Belief in the Face of Controversy”, in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted A. 
Warfield (OUP, 2010) (disagreeing peers should go agnostic).
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ment debate. The core of this position is that numbers count: the more peers 
don’t believe p, the more reason we have to think that p is false. If many peers 
don’t believe p, the proper conclusion to draw is that p is probably false. This 
paper is an examination of Lovering’s case for this ‘numbers count’ position.
Lovering argues that the mere fact that the friends of theistic arguments 
have failed to convince a majority of professional philosophers discredits 
their view. He summarizes his argument as follows:
The very existence of [nontheistic philosophical] epistemic peers makes it 
clear that theistic inferentialists have failed to make the inferential case for 
theism to them. And that they have failed to do so is a problem […] I refer to 
this as the “problem of the theistic inferentialists”. […] I shall then argue that 
of the most plausible possible solutions to this problem — each is either in-
adequate or incompatible with theistic inferentialist’s defining beliefs. Thus, 
I conclude that the problem of the theistic inferentialists […] is a problem for 
the theistic inferentialists — an objection to their defining beliefs.3
To get a clear view of the argument4, elaboration is required. First, who are 
the theistic inferentialists and what are their defining beliefs? Lovering is very 
clear about this: theistic inferentialists are theists “who are or were professional 
philosophers or who have or had enough philosophical training to be one.”5 He 
3 Rob Lovering, God and Evidence: Problems for Theistic Philosophers (Bloomsbury, 2013), 
21. The argument we shall be discussing is the substance of ibid., ch. 2; the chapter incorpo-
rates much material from Rob Lovering, “The Problem of the Theistic Evidentialist Philoso-
phers”, Philo 13, no. 2 (2010). What Lovering 2013 refers to as ‘theistic inferentialists’ is the 
same group of persons as what Lovering 2010 refers to as ‘theistic evidentialist philosophers’.
4 Lovering’s argument is the first argument in a larger philosophical project that contains 
five more arguments against (or problems for) various forms of theism (see Lovering, God 
and Evidence.). His second argument states that the fact that noninferential evidence for God’s 
existence (i.e. religious experiences) is scarcely apprehended, is a problem for theistic nonin-
ferentialists (i.e. theists who believe that there is noninferential probabilifying evidence for 
God that is discoverable in practice). His third argument is aimed at theistic fideists (i.e. the-
ists who believe that there is no discoverable probabilifying evidence for God’s existence but 
believe that it’s nonetheless morally acceptable to have faith that God exists). Lovering argues 
that having such faith without evidence can result in endangering, harming, and/or violating 
the rights of others. Lovering’s fourth and fifth argument are aimed at all theists. The fourth 
states that skeptical theism (the claim that our cognitive abilities are too limited to make claims 
about what God does or will do) casts doubt on theistic claims. The fifth states that divine 
omniscience is impossible because God cannot know what it is like not to know. In this paper 
we focus exclusively on Lovering’s first argument because, arguably, most theists adopt (some 
form of) theistic inferentialism. We also believe this argument is his most original one.
5 Ibid., 4.
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mentions the millennia-old tradition to which belong such philosophers as 
St. Augustine, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, William Paley, Richard Swinburne, 
Alvin Plantinga, Robin Collins, and William Lane Craig.6 Their defining be-
liefs, he says, are
(a) that God exists,
(b) that there is inferential probabilifying evidence of God’s existence,
(c) that this evidence is discoverable not simply in principle, but in practice.7
Lovering indicates that the phrase “discoverable not simply in principle, but 
in practice” means to rule out scenarios in which the evidence exists but is 
inaccessible to humans. An example of such a scenario is the existence of a 
goblet, the evidence for which is a sound that lies outside the range in which 
humans can hear. This evidence, he says, is discoverable in principle, but not 
in practice.8
Second, the summary statement says that
theists have failed to make the inferential case for theism” to their non-the-
istic philosophical peers. The evidence adduced for this is that “according 
to a recent survey of 931 philosophy faculty members, 15 percent accept or 
lean toward theism, 73 percent accept or lean towards atheism (‘religious 
sceptics’), and the rest accept or lean toward the ‘other’ category (of which 
some undoubtedly accept or lean towards agnosticism). Since accepting or 
leaning toward atheism or ‘other’ involves not accepting or leaning toward 
theism, an overwhelming 85 percent of these philosophy faculty members 
do not accept or lean toward theism.9
6 And so, if theistic inferentialists failed to convince non-theists, it is not for lack of trying. 
Lovering’s reference to the long history of theistic arguments is meant to make the argument 
intuitively all the more compelling. And in a way it does. An argument that has been around 
for a long time and has not convinced, say, 85% of its intended audience, is worse off than a 
relatively new argument that has not convinced 85% of its intended audience. In the case of 
theistic arguments this matter is complicated by the fact that there are so many different ‘kinds’ 
of theistic arguments (cosmological, ontological, moral, design arguments, among others) and 
that each ‘kind’ of argument has seen so many different ‘versions’ — some of which are rela-
tively new. This is a point we deal with in section 2(b), where we discuss premise P2.
7 Ibid., 20.
8 Lovering, “The Problem of the Theistic Evidentialist Philosophers”, 2.
9 Lovering, God and Evidence, 2. Lovering’s source is the survey that was eventually pub-
lished as David Bourget and David J. Chalmers, “What do philosophers believe?”, Philosophi-
cal Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 170, no. 3 (2014); 
preliminary versions of this survey have been available on the internet. Lovering, God and 
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Third, the summary statement of the argument says that the most plau-
sible explanations as to why theistic evidentialists have not convinced 85 
percent of their peers, are problematic for or incompatible with the theistic 
inferentialist’s defining beliefs. Lovering deems the following explanations to 
be the most plausible ones10:
#1 Nontheistic philosophers are intellectually inferior to theistic philos-
ophers when it comes to evaluating the inferential evidence for God’s 
existence.
#2 Nontheistic philosophers are culpably ignorant of the inferential evi-
dence for God’s existence.
#3 God prevents nontheistic philosophers from noticing the inferential 
evidence for God’s existence.
#4 Theistic philosophers have been unable to adequately articulate the 
inferential evidence for God’s existence.
#5 At least one of the theistic inferentialists’ defining beliefs is false.
#6 At least one of the theistic inferentialists’ defining beliefs is cogni-
tively meaningless.11
Lovering next argues that explanations #1–#4 are inadequate, whereas 
explanations #5 and #6 adequate. This means, of course, that #5 and #6 are 
Evidence, 23, fn. 2 refers to http://philpapers.org/suveys/results.pl?affil=Target+faculty&areas
0=0&areas_max=1&grain=coarse.
10 Ibid., 25–38.
11 Lovering’s list of explanations is in fact longer. He also lists three solutions that all involve 
the claim that theists lack inferential evidence. The three solutions differ in what is added to 
this claim, viz. (i) that the lack is not a problem, since theists may find such inferential evi-
dence in the future, or (ii) that the lack is not a problem, since nontheistic philosophers don’t 
have evidence for the non-existence of God that has silenced the theistic philosophers, or (iii) 
that the lack is not a problem, since agreement among philosophers is rare anyway. We have 
edited the list in the body of the text for obvious reasons: the three omitted explanations are 
all instances of explanation #5 — as they go against the theistic inferentialist’s defining belief 
(b), according to which there is inferential probabilifying evidence for God’s existence. We are 
assuming that the theistic inferentialist in believing (b) and (c) must also be held to believe that 
he possesses the evidence. If he were not held to believe this, he can hardly be charged for not 
having convinced 85% of his peers. One cannot convince someone else by evidence that one 
doesn’t possess (but merely believes to exist).
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supposed to be better explanations than the others. This may not mean that 
#5 and #6 are supposed to be the best explanations full stop, but it does mean 
that they are the best of the set.
Given these clarifications we can now state Lovering’s argument some-
what more precisely as follows:
P1: Theistic inferentialists have failed to convince an overwhelming ma-
jority (viz. 85 percent) of their intellectual peers.
P2: The best explanation of the fact stated in P1 is that at least one of the 
theistic inferentialists’ defining beliefs is false or meaningless.
C: Therefore, it is probably true that at least one of the theistic inferen-
tialists’ defining beliefs is false or cognitively meaningless.
This argument is an inference to the best explanation. As a number of au-
thors have noted, saying that E is the best explanation of fact F does not estab-
lish the truth of E, nor that E is probably true, it only renders E more probable 
than its competitors. For all we know the best explanation may be “the best of 
a bad lot”, to use Van Fraassen’s expression.12 This may be so because the list 
of possible explanations is not exhaustive, and hence additional explanations 
might be better than those not coming out best. One may want to fault Lov-
ering’s argument simply for being an inference to the best explanation. Since 
such criticism is not new and would not have anything in special to do with 
Lovering’s argument, we won’t pursue it further.
Should we be convinced by this argument? The first thing to see is that the 
argument is formally valid: if the premises are true and acceptable, then so is the 
conclusion. But are the premises true and acceptable? We argue they are not.
12 Bas C. van Fraassen, Laws and symmetry (Clarendon Press, 1989), 143; an overview of 
other criticisms of inferences to the best explanation can be found in Igor Douven, “Abduc-
tion”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2011, http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/abduction/, section 3.1; Peter Lipton, “Is the Best 
Good Enough?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1993).
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2. THE ARGUMENT EXAMINED
a. The Argument’s Conclusion
We begin our examination by considering the argument’s conclusion. This 
conclusion is such that it could be true in many different ways, since each of 
the inferentialist’s defining beliefs (a), (b), or (c) could be false or meaning-
less. In this section we argue, first, that not all the ways in which the conclu-
sion could be true, are equally damaging for the theistic inferentialist, and 
second, that the theist’s presumed defining belief (c), i.e. “that the evidence 
for God’s existence is discoverable not simply in principle, but in practice”, is 
problematic independently of religious concerns one might have.
The argument’s conclusion could be true in various different ways. Let 
us canvass the possibilities. Are any of the inferentialist’s defining beliefs (a), 
(b), and/or (c) meaningless? They certainly look meaningful: they are intelli-
gible, we can envision what would have to be the case if they were to be true, 
we can draw inferences from them, etc. And Lovering’s 12-sentence discus-
sion of this matter13 gives no reason to take the possibility that (a), (b), and/
or (c) are meaningless seriously. Even Lovering doesn’t seem to think that 
(b) and (c) are meaningless. For he seems to be implying that there is no 
probabilifying evidence for God’s existence — something he can only say if 
he thinks that (b) is a meaningful proposition. And he clearly thinks that (c) 
is meaningful — for, as we noted, he even explains its meaning. As to (a): of 
course, Neopositivists like A.J. Ayer thought the statement “God exists” is 
meaningless.14 But they adopted the verification criterion of meaning that, as 
Plantinga once said, has receded into the obscurity it so richly deserves.15 It 
has so receded for a number of reasons none of which Lovering even tries to 
refute or undermine. Hence we feel justified to put the “meaningless” part of 
the conclusion to one side.
This means that the argument’s conclusion could be true if at least one of 
the inferentialist’s defining beliefs is false. Hence, if an theistic inferentialist 
is to be convinced by Lovering’s argument, at least one of her defining beliefs 
13 Lovering, God and Evidence, 38.
14 Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (Dover Publications, 2012 [1952]).
15 See Alvin Plantinga, God and other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in 
God (Cornell Univ. Press, 1967).
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must be shown to be false. We shall now argue that not all the ways in which 
the argument’s conclusion could be true, would, if true, be equally damaging 
for the inferentialist qua theist. It would be quite damaging if the inferential-
ist qua theist were forced to give up (a), theism. If an inferentialist theist were 
forced to give up one of her defining beliefs, she would almost certainly not 
opt for (a). How great would the damage be if she were to retain (a), but reject 
(b)? The damage would be smaller for she would still be a theist. Inspired by 
Alvin Plantinga’s ‘Reformed Epistemology’, for example, she might adopt the 
idea that belief in God can be entirely rational and proper even in the absence 
of inferential, propositional, probabilifying evidence.16 She would then, of 
course, no longer be an theistic inferentialist as defined by Lovering, but still a 
theist. If an inferentialist were to drop belief in (b), but retain her theism, she 
still faces Lovering’s argument against theistic noninferentialism (see foot-
note 5).17 The smallest damage for a theistic inferentialist qua theist, however, 
would be to retain (a) and (b) and to reject (c), i.e. to reject the claim that 
inferential evidence is discoverable not simply in principle, but in practice.
What would such a rejection look like? In order to see that, we first need 
to take a closer look at (c). As noted, for Lovering evidence for X is discover-
able in principle provided the evidence exists. And evidence for X is discover-
able in practice provided it falls within the range of human experience. As we 
shall now show, however, it is debatable when evidence for X falls within the 
range of human experience. Let us reconsider Lovering’s example of a sound 
that is evidence for a goblet, but falls outside the human hearing range. Why 
should we think that the evidence really falls outside that range? After all, we 
can easily imagine a hearing aid, or some other device, that would make the 
evidence, somehow, accessible to someone’s experience. If Jane has such a 
device, but Jack has not, then for Jane the evidence is discoverable in practice, 
but not for Jack. Hence, being discoverable in practice must be relativized to 
16 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (OUP, 2000).
17 Lovering’s argument against this kind of theism (that proceeds from the problem of 
divine hiddenness, Lovering, God and Evidence, 41–62) lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
There are, however, interesting responses to the problem of divine hiddenness that Lovering 
doesn’t discuss: see the papers by Murray, Garcia, Wainwright, Moser, and Kvanvig in Daniel 
Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, eds., Divine hiddenness: New essays (CUP, 2002); see also 
Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures 2003 (Clarendon Press, 2006), 
Lecture 8.
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persons. Moreover, suppose Jane has the device but she is in coma; should we 
then say that for her, in that condition, the evidence for the goblet is discover-
able in practice? It would seem not. Hence, being discoverable in practice must 
be relativized to conditions as well. The problem with (c) is that it doesn’t 
contain these relativizations. Incorporating these in (c), we get
(c*) that this evidence for God’s existence exists, but it is not always ac-
cessible for everyone in every condition.
The case for (c*) can be strengthened. Think of Fermat’s famous Last Theo-
rem that was eventually proved by Andrew Wiles. Most contemporary pro-
fessional mathematicians are unable to follow all the details of Wiles’ proof.18 
Of course, in other conditions, e.g. the condition of having studied the proof 
intensely, or the condition of having improved mathematical powers, the evi-
dence for the Last Theorem is accessible, i.e. discoverable in practice. But for 
many mathematicians, being in the conditions they are in, and having the 
mathematical powers they have, the evidence is not accessible, i.e. not dis-
coverable in practice.
Where does this leave us? Here: a theistic inferentialist qua theist can hap-
pily accept Lovering’s conclusion, so accept that one of the theist’s inferential-
ist’s presumed defining beliefs (as defined by Lovering) is false. For a theist 
can happily grant that (c) should be rejected — it is untenable! This means 
that no theist, not even a theist who believes there is evidence for God’s exist-
ence, should be shaken by Lovering’s conclusion — but rather endorse it. This 
situation is brought about by the fact that Lovering hasn’t specifically argued 
for the falsity of either (a), or (b) or (c), and presumable has not realized that 
(c) is not as plausible to a theist as he anticipated it would be. He thus leaves 
space to the theist to reject (c) and hence enables her to agree with his conclu-
sion that was intended against the theist!
To this we may add that someone who accepts (a) and (b), rejects (c) 
but accepts (c*), still qualifies as a theistic inferentialist, albeit not in the way 
defined by Lovering. Lovering’s criticism concerns a rather extreme, and 
18 This is not to deny that many contemporary mathematicians have knowledge enough 
of some high-level ideas that enables them to intuitively see how the proof works and what it 
involves. But this contrasts with knowing the intricacies of the proof. On this difference see 
William P. Thurston, “On Proof and Progress in Mathematics”, in 18 Unconventional Essays on 
the Nature of Mathematics, ed. Reuben Hersh (Springer, 2006).
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as we argued untenable, version of theistic inferentialism, as it includes the 
problematic belief in (c). A weaker and more plausible version of theistic in-
ferentialism, one including (c*), however, is left unscathed by anything that 
Lovering has said.
So, a theist could happily accept Lovering’s conclusion by rejecting (c) 
and, by adopting (c*) still qualify as a modest theistic inferentialist.
We could leave it at this. But that could look cheap. For Lovering’s argu-
ment is informed by ideas, incorporated in premises P1 and P2, that merit 
further attention, even if they aren’t part of an argument whose conclusion 
should give a theist, not even a (modest) theistic inferentialist, pause. For 
these premises do contain ideas that are problematic for theists. We now ar-
gue that P1 and P2 are problematic as they stand, and should not be accepted.
(b) Premise P1
Premise P1 (“Theistic inferentialists have failed to convince 85 percent of 
their intellectual peers”) states an alleged fact. The evidence for it is the Bour-
get/Chalmers survey — a survey of the beliefs of professional philosophers 
from reputable institutions in mainly the Anglo-Saxon world, esp. the U.S.19 
In this section we argue that this survey does not support the alleged fact that 
theistic inferentialists have failed to convince 85 percent of their peers, and 
hence that P1 cannot taken to have been established by Lovering. Crucial to 
our argument is a certain understanding of what it is for one person to fail to 
convince another20:
S failed to convince S* that p is the case iff: (i) S presented evidence in 
favor of P to S* in such a way that S* became aware of the evidence, (ii) 
S* seriously studied the evidence, and (iii) S* wasn’t convinced by the 
evidence that p is the case.
To work our way to our argument, we consider the survey in somewhat 
more detail. Philosophers from elite PhD granting departments mainly in 
the English-speaking world were asked to answer no less than 30 question, 
19 See Bourget and Chalmers, “What do philosophers believe?”. The survey was sent to all 
regular faculty members of 99 leading departments of philosophy. Of these, seven were located 
in non-English speaking countries in continental Europe. The total target group consisted of 
1972 philosophers of whom 931 (47,2%) responded.
20 Lovering offers no analysis of this phrase.
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such as “ Apriori knowledge: yes or no?”, “Abstract objects: yes or no?”, “Free 
will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?”, and also “God: theism or 




This overview indicates that 85 percent does not accept theism.
Although this is isn’t going to affect our argument directly, it is highly 
relevant to point out that these numbers are problematic in that they are ob-
tained from a survey among philosophers from only elite departments main-
ly in the English-speaking world. For Neil Gross and Solon Simmons found 
that people at elite institutions are less religious than people in the academy 
in general.22 A more representative sample of philosophers, e.g. also coming 
from small liberal arts colleges and state colleges that only offer undergradu-
ate degrees, would have given less skewed numbers.23
Can it be concluded, on the basis of the survey, that theistic inferential-
ists have failed to convince 85 percent of their intellectual peers, as P1 has it? 
It seems not — at least, not on our plausible analysis of “failed to convince”. 
For the survey doesn’t indicate that the participants satisfy conditions (i) and 
(ii). I.e. the survey doesn’t provide evidence that the participants were aware 
of the theistic arguments, nor that they have seriously studied them. It is cer-
tainly the case that the examples of theistic inferentialists philosophers Lov-
ering mentioned (St. Augustine, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, William Paley, 
Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, Robin Collins, and William Lane Craig) 
presented their arguments with the goal of convincing their epistemic peers. 
21 Ibid., 476, percentages rounded.
22 Neil Gross and Solon Simmons, “The Religiosity of American College and Univ. Profes-
sors”, Sociology of Religion 70, no. 2 (2009). Gross and Simmons draw their conclusions from 
a survey among full time college and Univ. professors in the USA. They do not mention how 
many people were contacted but they got a response of 1417. The results of the top 50 universi-
ties in the U.S. News and World Report Ranking were compared to other institutions. Partici-
pants could choose between the statements ‘I don’t believe in God’; ‘I don’t know whether there 
is a God’; ‘I do believe in a higher power’; ‘I find myself believing in God some of the time’; 
‘While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God’; ‘I know God really exists and I have no 
doubts about it’.
23 Ibid. found that the majority of professors, even at elite institutions, are religious believers.
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It is, however, not unreasonable to think that their arguments only reached a 
limited number of epistemic peers. In the current academic climate it is not 
unlikely that publication pressure forces academics to focus their research 
(very) narrowly and hence to not familiarize themselves with theistic evi-
dence if this lies outside of their research focus. This means that the survey, 
strictly speaking, provides no evidence for the proposition that theistic infer-
entialists have failed to convince their peers. Hence, P1 cannot be considered 
to be established by the evidence adduced.24
Lovering might respond that there are philosophers who we know were 
or are familiar with most or the most important arguments for the existence 
of God but were not convinced.25 However, this is too small a minority to 
conclude that the theistic inferentialists have failed to convince the majority 
of academic peers.
24 Also, it is unlikely that those who accept or lean towards atheism and who have indeed 
studied the inferential evidence for theism, have studied all or even most of the evidence that 
has been adduced by theistic inferentialists — and such arguments are numerous. Alvin Plant-
inga listed 25 arguments, most of them dependent on different evidence, cf. Alvin Plantinga, 
“Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments: Lecture Notes”, (unpublished manuscript, 1986). The 
recent Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology lists 11 arguments, each of them involving 
different sorts evidence, see William L. Craig and James P. Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Com-
panion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). And especially the ontological and cos-
mological arguments have a great number of variants (for a survey of ontological arguments, 
see Plantinga Alvin Plantinga, ed., The Ontological Argument from St. Anselm to Contemporary 
Philosophers (Macmillan, 1968), and Mirosław Szatkowski, ed., Ontological Proofs Today (On-
tos, 2012); for a survey of cosmological arguments, see William Lane Craig, The cosmological 
argument from Plato to Leibniz (Macmillan, 1980), and Emanuel Rutten, Towards a Renewed 
Case for Theism: A Critical Assessment of Contemporary Cosmological Arguments ([S.l.: s.n.], 
2012). As it is unlikely that the majority of philosophers accepting or leaning towards atheism 
are familiar with most of the inferential evidence for the existence of God, it cannot be claimed 
that the evidence fails to convince the majority of philosophers. For failing to convince, on 
our plausible analysis, requires awareness of the evidence and a serious study of it. But these 
remarks are strictly speaking beside the point — the point being that the Bourget/Chalmers 
survey simply offers no evidence that conditions (i) and (ii) for ‘failing to convince’ are satis-
fied, and hence cannot be adduced as evidence for P1 (“Theistic inferentialists have failed to 
convince 85 percent of their intellectual peers”).
25 E.g. J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and Against the Existence of God 
(Clarendon Press, 1982), Nicholas Everitt, The non-existence of God: An introduction (Rout-
ledge, 2003), Graham Oppy, Arguing about Gods (CUP, 2006), and Herman Philipse, God in 
the Age of Science? A Critique of Religious Reason (OUP, 2012).
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Lovering might also respond that theistic inferentialists had ample time 
to convince their epistemic peers. The fact that their arguments have been 
around for centuries combined with the fact that after all those centuries 
few academic philosophers consider themselves theists could yield a nega-
tive verdict on the theistic inferentialist’s defining beliefs, especially on (a). 
We respond by noting that St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and many other 
likely did succeed in convincing many of their contemporary and even many 
of their subsequent epistemic peers. Hence, a reference to the long history of 
theistic arguments does not support P1, but rather weakens it. Reference to 
the long history of theistic arguments also does little to evade the problems 
with P1 that we discussed above. Notwithstanding the fact that these argu-
ments have a long history, it is still not unlikely that many current academic 
philosophers have not studied many, or most, theistic arguments. Further-
more, some theistic arguments are of relatively recent date — for example 
Moreland’s argument from consciousness.26 No argument from having a long 
history (if such an argument would be compelling at all) has a grip on such 
recent arguments.
There is, moreover, empirical evidence relevant to this issue that was 
available to Lovering, but that he has not taken into consideration. The Bour-
get/Chalmers survey indicates that among philosophers who specialize in 
the philosophy of religion (and hence are more likely to have studied the 
evidence in detail), 73 percent lean toward or accept theism.27 But this means 
that if the following is a good argument
The fact that 85 percent of philosophers don’t believe in God is best ex-
plained by supposing that at least one of the theistic inferentialists’ defin-
ing beliefs is false,
then the following argument must be equally good:
The fact that 73 percent of philosophers of religion are theists, is best 
explained by supposing that the theistic inferentialists’ defining beliefs 
are true.
26 James P. Moreland, “The argument from consciousness”, in The Blackwell Companion to 
Natural Theology, ed. William L. Craig and James P. Moreland (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). The 
argument claims that the phenomenon consciousness is best explained by God’s existence.
27 Bourget and Chalmers, “What do philosophers believe?”, 482.
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It might in fact even be better, for philosophers of religion may be thought to 
be the experts on arguments for God’s existence.
One might, however, be sceptical about this last suggestion for the fol-
lowing reason: the overrepresentation of theists in the philosophy of religion 
might indicate that theists are too much influenced by prior beliefs when they 
evaluate religious arguments. It might indicate a confirmation bias.28
In order to evaluate this, another recent survey is relevant, one con-
ducted by De Cruz and De Smedt.29 Their survey confirmed the findings of 
Bourget/Chalmers: among philosophers of religion the percentage of theists 
is high — some 73 percent. This survey presented eight arguments for the-
ism, and eight arguments for atheism, and participants (who were recruited 
through philosophy mailing lists) were asked to rate the strength of these 
arguments. Participants were also asked to indicate their philosophical area 
of specialization, and whether they identified themselves as ‘theist’, ‘atheist’, 
or ‘agnostic/undecided’. One outcome of the survey is that theists rated argu-
ments that support theism significantly higher than atheists. Another out-
come is that atheists rated arguments against theism significantly higher than 
theists. In fact De Cruz and De Smedt found a strong correlation between re-
ligious belief (or lack thereof) and the assessment of arguments. So, if there is 
a confirmation bias, it works both ways, which takes the sting out of Draper’s 
and Nichols’s argument. DeCruz and De Smedt conclude: “We thus found a 
confirmation of our prediction that religious belief significantly influences 
the evaluation of religious arguments: theists, atheists and agnostics differ in 
how they evaluate arguments for and against the existence of God. The results 
are highly significant overall.”
The main conclusion of this section is that the evidence that Lovering 
offers in order to established P1 is insufficient to the task. The secondary con-
clusion is that if Lovering’s case for P1 is deemed to be compelling, then an 
28 This has been suggested by Paul Draper, Ryan Nichols, and Sherwood J. B. Sugden, “Di-
agnosing Bias in Philosophy of Religion”, Monist 96, no. 3 (2013).
29 Helen de Cruz and De Smedt Johan, “How do philosophers evaluate natural theological 
arguments? An experimental philosophical investigation”, in Advances in religion, cognitive sci-
ence, and experimental philosophy, ed. Helen Cruz and Ryan Nichols, Advances in experimen-
tal philosophy (Bloomsbury, 2016) The survey was completed by 802 participants of which 
82 percent were professional philosophers. 40.5 percent self-identified as theists and 40.4 as 
atheists. The remaining 19.1 self-identified as agnostics.
RENÉ VAN WOUDENBERG & HANS VAN EYGHEN100
analogous case for the conclusion that the theistic inferentialist’s beliefs are 
true can be deemed equally or even more compelling.
(c) Premise P2
Lovering devotes most of his attention to premise P2: “The best explanation 
of the fact that the vast majority of philosophers remain unconvinced by the 
theistic inferentialists is that at least one of the inferentialists’ defining beliefs 
is false.”
Since P2 makes a comparative claim about what best explains a certain 
fact, if we want to evaluate P2 we will have to compare various explanations 
and estimate their relative strengths.
Note that Lovering doesn’t hold
Falsity Explains Disbelief: If most people disbelieve P, that fact is best 
explained by P’s falsity,
which is a principle that is clearly false, as the following example bears out: at 
one time most people disbelieved heliocentrism, but this fact, surely, is not 
best explained by heliocentrism’s falsehood. Rather, Lovering adopts some-
thing like the following principle
Most Experts Don’t Believe Falsehoods (MEDBF): if a majority of the ex-
perts (so people who are experts in a field to which P belongs) don’t 
believe in P, this fact is best explained by P’s falsity.
Should we accept MEDBF? There seem to be fields where this principle is 
clearly true. For example, in the field of climate studies, the vast majority of 
experts don’t believe the proposition that there is no global warming; and 
you might think that this is best explained by that proposition’s falsity. Like-
wise, in the field of cosmology, experts don’t believe in geocentrism; and 
this, again is best explained by geocentrism’s falsehood. But there seem to 
be other fields, economics and psychiatry are examples, where the numbers 
of dissenting experts rise. If a majority of 60 percent economists disbelieve 
Keynesianism, then this fact is not obviously best explained by Keynesian-
ism’s falsity. This is just to say that in this field MEDBF isn’t clearly true. 
We ask: what accounts for this difference? We answer: the difference is ac-
counted for by the availability, in a field, of established facts. Climate sci-
ence, cosmology and other natural sciences have conjured up innumerably 
many established facts. Economics and psychiatry less so. Intuitively, differ-
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ent fields of study can be placed on a continuum that measures the number 
of established facts in a field. And now the following principle commends 
itself (again at an intuitive level): the more established facts a field counts, 
the more MEDBF will be true of experts in that field, and the less established 
facts a field counts, the less MEDBF will be true of experts in that field.
Now P2 betrays a commitment to MEDBF. This raises the question to 
what degree MEDBF is true in the field in which Lovering is moving. That 
is to say: is the field of philosophy such that the experts in it are such that 
MEDBF is true of them? For an answer we need to ask whether philosophy 
has conjured up established facts. The answer, we fear, must be: not very 
many. Philosophy in general and metaphysics and epistemology in particu-
lar are not fields with many established facts, and they are hence unlike cli-
mate science and cosmology. Because of this the study of them doesn’t seem 
to provide us with information about parts and aspects of the world. This is 
familiar to every working metaphysician and epistemologist.30 There are no 
established facts about, say, the existence of universals (nominalists and real-
ists still disagree), the existence of time (endurantists oppose perdurantists), 
the relation between minds and bodies (dualism is by no means a dead op-
tion), etc. There are no established facts about the nature of knowledge, the 
nature of justification, about whether internalism or externalism is correct, 
about whether contextualist views of knowledge state it like it is etc. This is 
not to deny that there are metaphysical or epistemological facts. But it is to 
deny that there are many established metaphysical or epistemological facts.
One problem with P2, then, is that it assumes MEDBF and MEDBF is 
only applicable to philosophy if we assume that there are established philo-
sophical facts, of which there aren’t many.
Where does this leave us with respect to Lovering’s preferred explana-
tion of the fact that the vast majority of philosophers remain unconvinced 
by the theistic inferentialists — the explanation being that at least one of the 
inferentialists’ defining beliefs is false (= explanation #5)? Here: #5 assumes 
that MEDBF true in the field of philosophy. We have thrown cold water on 
this assumption, and hence on #5, and hence on P2.
30 See for instance Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics, 3rd ed. (Perseus, 2009), 10–11; David 
J. Chalmers, David Manley and Ryan Wasserman, eds., Metametaphysics: New essays on the 
foundations of ontology (OUP, 2009) is testimony of the fact. This point is less acknowledged 
by epistemologists.
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Explanation #5 raises another worry that Lovering does not even ad-
dress. If the best explanation of the fact that 85 percent of the philosophers 
remain unconvinced by the theistic inferentialists is that some of the theistic 
inferentialists’ defining beliefs are false, the question arises: what explains 
the fact of the other 15 percent? If the explanation for not believing “God 
exists” is the falsity of that proposition, then what can the explanation for 
believing that proposition be? Lovering could argue that the 15% made an 
(honest) mistake. This response, however, is weak because 15% of 1972 phi-
losophers still amounts to a significant number which stands in need of an 
explanation. Neither can the explanation be that “God exists” is true, for it 
is presumed to be false. This leaves us, probably, with the usual suspects, 
i.e. explanation in terms of projection, childhood-neurosis, evolutionary 
by-product or adaptation etc. However, Lovering has barred that way for 
himself. For when he discusses explanations #1 and #2 of the fact that 85 
percent remain unconvinced — explanations that involve theological doc-
trines like the Calvinist doctrine of total depravity, or the doctrine that sin 
impairs both intellect and will — he says: “if theistic inferentialists were to 
believe that nontheistic philosophers are … inferior by simply assuming a 
theology to be true, nontheistic philosophers could likewise assume an athe-
ology to be true, one that entails that theistic inferentialists are the ones who 
are dispositionally inferior. This would … do nothing more than lead to an 
impasse.”31 But if this is Lovering’s line, then he cannot give an explanation 
for the remaining 15 percent.32 And if, his own words notwithstanding, he 
would attempt such an explanation, then, by parity of reasons, the theist 
must be allowed her explanation of the 85 percent fact. This means that the 
other explanations, that Lovering deems inadequate, are back on the table. 
And so now the question to consider is whether #5 is really the best explana-
tion of the 85 percent fact — i.e. an explanation that is better than its com-
petitors #1–4, or than any other possible explanation that Lovering has not 
listed.
Is explanation #5 (‘at least one of the inferentialist’s defining beliefs is 
false’ — and here we concentrate on (a) and (b), and leave (c), which is, as 
31 Lovering, God and Evidence, 27.
32 Lovering could still argue that the 15% simply made a mistake but he cannot make this 
claim without assuming the falsity of theism.
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we have argued untenable, out of consideration) better than explanation #1 
(‘nontheistic philosophers are intellectually inferior to their theistic col-
leagues’)? We have argued that #5 is unsatisfactory. Is it nonetheless better 
than #1? Well, #1 itself isn’t plausible either: there is no empirical evidence 
that indicates that non-theists are intellectually inferior (or superior) to the-
ists. Is nonetheless one of them the better of the two? On the basis of what 
we have said so far, this cannot be decided.
Is perhaps explanation #2 (‘nontheists are somehow culpably ignorant 
of the evidence of God’s existence’, perhaps due to the lack of a receptive 
attitude,33 or due to the noetic effects of sin’34) better than either explana-
tion #1 or explanation #5? Lovering claims that it is unlikely that nontheistic 
philosophers en masse wilfully reject evidence for God’s existence or refuse 
to consider it. He affirms that a similar claim as explanation #2 in other 
domains of philosophy would not be convincing. For example, it would not 
be appropriate if theistic inferentialists were to explain disagreements with 
nontheistic philosophers over ethics by claiming the latter are culpably igno-
rant by lacking a receptive attitude or the cognitive effects of sin. However, 
we think that lacking in receptive attitude, and cognitive effects of sin, may 
very well be a better explanation than #1 or #5. And this for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, wilfully rejecting theism is not the same as lack of a recep-
tive attitude or suffering from noetic effects of sin (as Lovering seems to sug-
gest). Wilful rejection suggests a conscious decision not to give the evidence 
of God’s existence the attention it deserves. Lovering cites Paul Moser and 
Alvin Plantinga as authors who argued for something like explanation #2. 
Especially Plantinga’s explanation does not fit Lovering’s framing as ‘wil-
ful rejection’ well. Plantinga suggests that nontheistic philosophers remain 
unconvinced because of the noetic effects of sin. Being subject to the noetic 
effects of sin does not mean that people consciously reject evidence for God’s 
existence. They rather find themselves in a state where the force of the evi-
dence is not clear to them. Moser’s suggestion of a lack of receptive attitude 
on behalf of nontheistic philosophers also does not amount to a conscious 
decision not to give the evidence its fair due. On his view, a receptive atti-
33 Paul K. Moser, “Cognitive Idolatry and Divine Hiding”, in Howard-Snyder; Moser, Divine 
Hiddenness.
34 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief.
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tude encompasses much more than an intellectual decision but also a change 
in one’s direction of life and priorities.35 Lovering only argues against the 
stronger claim of wilful rejection. He gives no argument against the possibil-
ity of noetic effects of sin or a lack of receptive attitude among nontheistic 
philosophers. If there is theistic inferential evidence, the fact that not all phi-
losophers are theists may at least in part be explained by a lack of receptive 
attitude, or cognitive effects of sin. There is also reason to think that culpable 
ignorance may be more an issue in the debate over God’s existence than in 
other debates in philosophy. As Plantinga has said, the cognitive effects of 
sin may have an effect on knowledge of God above anything else.36 Another 
reason for taking #2 seriously is that inferentialist evidence alone may only 
very rarely be sufficient for conviction. An analogy with moral psychology 
illuminates our point. It has been argued that certain moral truths cannot 
be believed by persons who lack certain emotions — even when those truths 
are presented to them with rigor, force and show of argument. The presence 
of such emotions is a necessary condition for someone to acquire the moral 
belief in question.37 Something similar may be true for theistic belief. This 
means that in addition to the explanation of the 85 percent fact in terms of 
lack of receptive attitude and cognitive effects of sin, the explanation may 
be in terms of the absence of certain emotions. Studies on persons with au-
tism spectrum disorder confirm this point and suggest that they lack the 
necessary emotions concerning mind reading to be receptive for religious 
belief.38 A recent cognitive theory of atheism elaborates on this. Gervais and 
Norenzayan suggested that the intuitive processes leading to religious belief 
35 Moser writes: “We need a change of receptive attitude to apprehend the available evidence 
in the right way. This change involves the direction of our lives,including our settled priorities, 
not just our intellectual assent.”, in Paul K. Moser, “Divine Hiddenness Does Not Justify Athe-
ism”, in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Michael L. Peterson and Raymond 
J. Vanarragon, (Blackwell, 2004), 47.
36 Plantinga writes: “Our original knowledge of God […] has been severely compromised 
[…]. [B]ecause of the fall, we no longer know God in the same natural and unproblematic way 
in which we know each other and the world around us.” Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 
205.
37 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment (OUP, 
2004); Jesse Prinz, “The emotional basis of moral judgments”, Philosophical Explorations 9, 
no. 1 (2006).
38 Ara Norenzayan and Will M. Gervais, “The origins of religious disbelief ”, Trends in cogni-
tive sciences 17, no. 1 (2013).
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can be revised or overruled by analytic processes. Results from priming ex-
periments confirmed their theory.39 Their point was confirmed by two other 
studies.40 Since religious belief requires more emotional or imagination like 
styles of thinking, an overemphasis on analytic thinking is likely to make 
people less receptive for belief in God. One could thus argue that doing a 
certain kind of analytic philosophy, like logic, formal epistemology or for-
mal philosophy of science, makes some philosophers less receptive for belief 
in God. It is also possible that non-theists lack a receptive attitude due to 
confirmation biases as De Cruz and De Smedt have argued.41
One may very well think that this (augmented) explanation #2 is bet-
ter than #1 and #5, as there is empirical evidence for it, which there is not 
for Lovering’s preferred but inadequate #5, nor for #1. Moreover, #2 is fully 
compatible with the questionnaire evidence. To take #2 as a live option does 
not entail that if it is a correct, it provides a complete explanation of the 
85 percent fact. Perhaps for some nontheistic philosophers #2 provides the 
complete explanation, whereas for others it provides a partial explanation 
at best.
In cases where explanation #2 provides only a partial explanation, #4 
(‘theistic inferentialists have inadequately presented the evidence’) may do 
additional explanatory work. There is no reason to think that inferentialists 
always present their evidence in the best of ways. We return to this point 
below. This may explain at least in part why they have failed in convincing 
their nontheistic peers. #4 also has the virtue of being fully compatible with 
the 85 percent fact. There is no need to ask whether #4 is a better explanation 
than #2, as they may both be correct.
As to #3 (‘God prevents nontheistic philosophers from noticing the in-
ferential evidence’) theists may have theological reasons for thinking this 
may be true in some cases. For example, in response to the problem of di-
vine hiddenness a number of theistic philosophers have argued that God 
39 Will M. Gervais and Ara Norenzayan, “Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious Disbelief ”, 
Science 336, no. 6080 (2012).
40 Gordon Pennycook et al., “Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal be-
lief ”, Cognition 123, no. 3 (2012).
41 Cruz and De Smedt Johan, “How do philosophers evaluate natural theological argu-
ments? An experimental philosophical investigation”.
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hides himself to allow for free moral actions or spiritual growth.42 Again, 
this explanation needn’t compete with #2 and #4: all three of them may in 
some cases be partially true. Lovering’s problem with this explanation is that 
it seems ad hoc. He returns to his goblet analogy and writes: “Suppose the 
believers explained their failure to make their case to the skeptics on the 
grounds that evidence of the goblet may be found only by those who already 
believe  —  or are disposed to believe  —  that the goblet exists. This may be 
true, but looking in from the outside, such an explanation appears ad hoc.”43 
Our examples suffice to show that explanation #3 is not ad hoc. God can 
have reasons to hide himself and hence prevent (some) nontheistic philoso-
phers from noticing inferential evidence for his existence.
Explanation #4 (‘Theistic inferentialists have discovered evidence of 
God’s existence, but they have been unable to adequately articulate this evi-
dence to their sceptical counterpart’) is also not as implausible as Lovering 
claims. Lovering himself gives two examples of theistic inferential evidence 
that is very difficult to understand, viz. William Craig’s cosmological argu-
ment that relies on ‘metaphysical time’ and Alvin Plantinga’s modal onto-
logical argument. Lovering, however, argues that a God who would want to 
let himself be known would not solely rely on very difficult evidence. He ar-
gues that this explanation conflicts with God’s goodness, as it is very unlikely 
that God would only let his existence be known through complicated evi-
dence. He adds that at least some theistic inferentialists appear very skilled 
in articulating the evidence for God’s existence (his examples are Richard 
Swinburne, William Craig and Thomas Aquinas). Since we do not argue that 
explanation #4 by itself can explain the small number of convinced philoso-
phers, we need not deny that at least some theistic inferentialists were able to 
present the evidence adequately. Since the impact of one philosopher is lim-
ited, it is likely that not all philosophers know about the arguments of skilled 
philosophers like Swinburne, Craig and Aquinas (this especially holds for 
the first two). Some nontheistic philosophers might only have heard argu-
ments by less skilled philosophers.
42 E.g. Michael J. Murray, “Deus Absconditus”, Laura L. Garcia, “St. John of the Cross and the 
Necessity of Divine Hiddenness”, both in Howard-Snyder; Moser, Divine Hiddenness.
43 Lovering, God and Evidence, 28.
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Lovering also neglects the fact that philosophical arguments in general 
have become more complex during the last decades. For example, whereas ar-
guments for moral realism were fairly straightforward for a good part of the 
history of philosophy, recent versions are far more intricate. Theistic arguments 
are no different. This is mainly a result of counterarguments that led to refine-
ments and more nuance. As a result, many philosophical arguments are harder 
to understand, not necessarily because defenders lack skill but mainly because 
understanding them requires more training and background knowledge.
As to Lovering’s point that God’s goodness conflicts with difficult evidence, 
we note that there is no conflict. Lovering’s point is that a good God would 
provide clear and simple evidence for his existence. A God that only allows for 
complicated evidence will remain hidden for many people and this is a problem 
for any claim to his goodness. However, Lovering’s argument is about academic 
philosophers. Since academic philosophers can be expected to understand, in 
principle, difficult philosophical evidence, God is not putting unreasonable de-
mands on them when the evidence for his existence is complicated.
What we suggest, then, is that the conjunction of explanations #2, #3, 
and #4 provide a better explanation of the 85 percent fact than #5 and #1 for 
quite obvious reasons. First, #5, as we have suggested earlier on, doesn’t really 
explain anything, whereas the conjunction of explanations does. Moreover, 
whereas there is no empirical evidence for #5 or #1, there is some empirical 
evidence for the conjunctive explanation.
Lovering could respond that explanation #5 is a more simple explanation 
than a conjunction of explanation #2, #3 and #4 and that #5 is therefore a 
better explanation. The criterion of simplicity however only holds if all other 
things are equal. But in this case they are not equal. For we have argued that 
#5 fails for independent reasons.
3. ONE MORE PROBLEMATIC FEATURE OF THE ARGUMENT
The point we will be making in this section regards an ‘ingredient’ of Lover-
ing’s argument that is neither a premise, nor a conclusion. Perhaps it can be 
thought of as an implicit background assumption. The point concerns the 
relation between probability and conviction, or better: the relation between 
probability and the power to convince. Lovering clearly assumes that if evi-
dence is probabilifying, then it is (also) convincing evidence, i.e. then it (also) 
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has the power to convince persons — perhaps not just any person, but cer-
tainly the well-educated rational person. We argue against this by providing 
a counter example that stands for a whole class of like cases. The example 
shows that the fact that a piece of inferential evidence for claim C fails to con-
vince any (or many) persons, doesn’t entail that the inferential evidence isn’t 
therefore good evidence for C. It is supposed to show that there can be (very) 
good probabilifying evidence for propositions that are not widely believed.
The example comes from the history of science. Copernicus provided 
inferential probabilifying evidence for heliocentrism. Nonetheless, his evi-
dence didn’t convince very many of his contemporaries. Heliocentrism was 
not widely accepted until well into the 18th century. Yet few people will deny 
that Copernicus adduced probabilifying evidence for heliocentrism. Other 
examples are easy to come by.
But if this is correct, so if the fact that evidence fails to convince doesn’t 
mean that the evidence therefore isn’t good probabilifying evidence, this is an 
additional reason to be sceptical about Lovering’s argument. After all, Lover-
ing suggests that if the evidence adduced by theistic inferentialists doesn’t 
convince 85 percent of the philosophers, this means (because it is best ex-
plained that way) that the evidence adduced isn’t probabilifying evidence. But 
we have seen that this is wrong. And it better be. For Lovering’s assumption, 
if true, would be a most effective science stopper, as the heliocentrism case 
brings out. New ideas, also in science, will as a rule always meet with resist-
ance and rejection, even if the evidence for them is probabilifying. Hence, a 
background assumption of Lovering’s argument should be rejected for rea-
sons that having nothing to do with religious belief.
4. CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion, then, we have argued that:
• An theistic inferentialist can gladly accept the conclusion of Lover-
ing’s argument (“It is probably true that at least one of theistic infer-
entialist’s defining beliefs (a), (b), and (c) is false or cognitively mean-
ingless”). She can accept that without giving up (a) and (b), viz. if she 
gives up (c), for which there is solid reason. She can still continue to 
be a theistic inferentialist, in a somewhat weaker sense, viz. by adopt-
ing the independently plausible (c*).
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• Premise P1 (‘Theistic inferentialists have failed to convince the vast 
majority (i.e. 85 percent) of their intellectual peers’) has not been 
shown by the evidence to be true, as the evidence that is adduced 
doesn’t indicate that those who have filled out the questionnaire have 
actually seriously studied the inferentialists’ evidence.
• Premise P2, about what best explains the 85 percent fact, has not been 
established as it relies on the problematic assumption that MEDBF 
(the principle that says that most experts don’t believe falsehoods) is 
applicable to philosophy, which assumes there are established philo-
sophical (metaphysical and epistemological) facts. This is problem-
atic in that there are very few established philosophical facts.
• Premise P2 seems in fact false: #5 just doesn’t seem the best explana-
tion of the 85 percent fact. The conjunctive explanation of #2, #3, and 
#4, for all the evidence indicates, does a better job.
• The argument presupposes that if evidence is probabilifying, it is con-
vincing evidence. This presupposition, if true, would be a most effec-
tive science stopper. But it isn’t true.44
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